Mozilla Project Things is announced.
Mozilla Firefox Connect Devices project is abandoned.
the theory, the Web of Things (WoT)
the framework, the architecture
a meta-layer among the Great Cultures.
Web of Things
Software tack, shown later
Proprietary lock-in at the core; Internet of Things (IoT) is a “Great Cultures” system; <quote><snip>most home and industrial IoT vendors <snip/> align themselves with <snip/> IoT ecosystems pushed by a handful of the world’s largest tech companies. </quote>
<quote>All of these stacks include proprietary technology, as well as varying degrees of more open technologies that are more or less controlled by a single company.</quote>
TLS (Transport Layer Security)
Web Thing API
A Specification Proposal
“simple” <ahem>nobody ever comes out with a “complex” specification, now do they?</ahem>
Web Thing Description, a format
JSON, an encoding
a default [meaning something else could replace that?]
REST + WebSockets
Web Thing API
“Great Cultures”, a.k.a. “The Ecosystems”
The three more Linux-oriented ecosystems listed here —
Hyper-Text Transport Protocol (HTTP)
The transfer of hypertext
Representational State Transfer (REST)
The manifestation and transfer of a representation of the (internal) state of a workflow in zero or more remote applications; the workflow execitomg among the client and server(s)
Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Web Socket (WebSockets) Yes, everywhere except Opera
Lin-Shung Huang (CMU), Alex Rice (Facebook), Erling Ellingsen (Facebook), Collin Jackson (CMU); Analyzing Forged SSL Certificates in the Wild; In Proceedings of the 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP); 2014; 15 pages.
The SSL man-in-the-middle attack uses forged SSL certificates to intercept encrypted connections between clients and servers. However, due to a lack of reliable indicators, it is still unclear how commonplace these attacks occur in the wild. In this work, we have designed and implemented a method to detect the occurrence of SSL man-in-the-middle attack on a top global website, Facebook. Over 3 million real-world SSL connections to this website were analyzed. Our results indicate that 0.2% of the SSL connections analyzed were tampered with forged SSL certificates, most of them related to antivirus software and corporate-scale content filters. We have also identified some SSL connections intercepted by malware. Limitations of the method and possible defenses to such attacks are also discussed.
Client authentication on the web has remained in the internet-equivalent of the stone ages for the last two decades. Instead of adopting modern public-key-based authentication mechanisms, we seem to be stuck with passwords and cookies.
In this paper, we propose to break this stalemate by presenting a fresh approach to public-key-based client authentication on the web. We describe a simple TLS extension that allows clients to establish strong authenticated channels with servers and to bind existing authentication tokens like HTTP cookies to such channels. This allows much of the existing infrastructure of the web to remain unchanged, while at the same time strengthening client authentication considerably against a wide range of attacks.
We implemented our system in Google Chrome and Google’s web serving infrastructure, and provide a performance evaluation of this implementation.
We present new biases in RC4, break the Wi-Fi Protected Access Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (WPA-TKIP), and design a practical plaintext recovery attack against the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. To empirically find new biases in the RC4 keystream we use statistical hypothesis tests. This reveals many new biases in the initial keystream bytes, as well as several new long-term biases. Our fixed-plaintext recovery algorithms are capable of using multiple types of biases, and return a list of plaintext candidates in decreasing likelihood.
To break WPA-TKIP we introduce a method to generate a large number of identical packets. This packet is decrypted by generating its plaintext candidate list, and using redundant packet structure to prune bad candidates. From the decrypted packet we derive the TKIP MIC key, which can be used to inject and decrypt packets. In practice the attack can be executed within an hour. We also attack TLS as used by HTTPS, where we show how to decrypt a secure cookie with a success rate of 94% using 9*227 ciphertexts. This is done by injecting known data around the cookie, abusing this using Mantin’s ABSAB bias, and brute-forcing the cookie by traversing the plaintext candidates. Using our traffic generation technique, we are able to execute the attack in merely 75 hours.
RFC 7568 – Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0; R. Barnes, M. Thomson (Mozilla), A. Pironti (INRIA), A. Langley (Google); Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF); 2015-06.
The Secure Sockets Layer version 3.0 (SSLv3), as specified in RFC 6101, is not sufficiently secure. This document requires that SSLv3 not be used. The replacement versions, in particular, Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.2 (RFC 5246), are considerably more secure and capable protocols.
This document updates the backward compatibility section of RFC 5246 and its predecessors to prohibit fallback to SSLv3.